University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 12: Evidence, Persuasion & Diversity

Jun 6th, 9:00 AM - 10:00 AM

Connectives and Straw Men. Experimental approach on French
and English.
Jennifer Schumann
University of Berne

Sandrine Zufferey
University of Berne

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Schumann, Jennifer and Zufferey, Sandrine, "Connectives and Straw Men. Experimental approach on
French and English." (2020). OSSA Conference Archive. 6.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA12/Saturday/6

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Connectives and Straw Men: Experimental approach on French and
English.
JENNIFER SCHUMANN* & SANDRINE ZUFFEREY**
Department of French Language and Literature
University of Bern
Länggassstrasse 49
3012 Bern – Switzerland
jennifer.schumann@rom.unibe.ch *
sandrine.zufferey@rom.unibe.ch **
Abstract: In this paper, we present experiments designed to assess the role of causal connectives with an
attributive meaning (e.g. since and puisque) on the acceptability of straw man fallacies. Our results show that
connectives play a role for the detection of straw man fallacies by increasing readers’ awareness to the speaker’s
persuasive intent, thus creating a forewarning effect. We also uncover a crucial difference between causal
connectives both within and across languages. Taken together, our experiments plead in favor of conducting
fine-grained analyses of connectives in different languages in order to deepen our understanding of their role for
argumentation.
Keywords: Argumentation, causal connectives, cross-linguistic perspective, empirical validation, forewarning
effect, straw man fallacy, subjectivity

1. Introduction
The study of connectives, and discourse markers in general, through the lens of
argumentation is an established field. Yet, the influence of connectives for the acceptability
of fallacies, and on argumentation more generally, has not empirically been assessed. In
argumentation, discourse markers – a broad category that includes connectives – have been
discussed from various theoretical perspectives (e.g., Anscombre & Ducrot, 1983; Eemeren
et al., 2007a, 2007b). Whereas Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) suggest an approach that
theorizes the role of argumentation embedded in language, the pragma-dialecticians
(Eemeren et al., 2007b) offer a more general approach including connectives, discourse
markers and other expressions and their relation to argumentative moves. What these
approaches do not consider, however, is the different role played by specific connectives, as
the latter may well vary depending on the type of coherence relation they encode, or as we
argue here, their level of subjectivity. The straw man lends itself particularly well for
linguistic-oriented experimental testing. The characteristics of a straw man that make it a
fallacious argument rest on the linguistic structure used to perform it, since the distortion of
the original position is considered an essential feature of this fallacy (see e.g., Aikin & Casey,
2016; Oswald & Lewiński, 2014). Manipulating the linguistic form of the straw man by using
different causal connectives to introduce the fallacious argument therefore represents an
opportunity to investigate the role of linguistic markers and their impact on fallacies. In order
to better understand the linguistic characteristics of connectives that may impact their role for
the communication of fallacies, studies in the field of pragmatics and discourse processing
need to be considered, as they have provided extensive data on the role of connectives for
communication and cognition over the past decades. Yet, these studies have mostly
considered the role of connectives in descriptive rather than argumentative contexts. This
paper aims at filling the gap between more linguistic-oriented contributions and the more
argumentative-oriented study of fallacies. It also contributes to a better understanding of
causal connectives in argumentative context from a cross-linguistic perspective.
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2. The straw man fallacy
The study of fallacies has become a mainstay in argumentation theory over the past decades
(Hamblin, 1970; Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Hansen & Pinto, 1995; Walton, 1995;
Tindale, 2007). Research specifically focusing on the straw man fallacy however, has mostly
increased in more recent years (Aikin & Casey, 2011, 2016; Lewiński, 2011; Lewiński &
Oswald, 2013; Oswald & Lewiński, 2014; Saussure, 2018), even if pragma-dialecticians have
theorized it to some extent in the 1990s (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Eemeren &
Houtlosser, 1999). Most of these studies have tackled the subject from several different
normative and/or descriptive perspectives. Whereas pragma-dialectics focus on a normative
approach, defining the straw man fallacy as a violation of the third rule for critical discussion
(Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Eemeren et al., 2002; Eemeren et al., 2014), other
researchers like Aikin and Casey (2011; 2016) opt for a more descriptive approach,
highlighting that there are several forms of the fallacy including a straw man, a weak man, a
hollow man and an iron man. Oswald and Lewiński (2014) characterize the elements of the
straw man fallacy combining findings from pragma-dialectics and relevance theory, and
Saussure (2018) describes the fallacy from a more ethical and rhetorical perspective. But in
general, all approaches describe the straw man in a similar way, defining it as a
misrepresentation of an original position in order to more easily refute that position (see e.g.
Aikin & Casey, 2011, 2016; Eemeren et al., 2014; Oswald & Lewiński, 2014; Saussure,
2018). An essential aspect that characterizes the straw man is therefore the
misrepresentational element which is related to the linguistic structure (e.g. the use of
connectives to introduce an argument, the segmentation of the discourse elements, etc.)
which is used to convey the informational content. Many such linguistic structures lend
themselves for empirical testing.
Fallacies are increasingly studied from an experimental point of view (Eemeren et al.,
2012; Hahn & Hornikx, 2016; Harris et al., 2016; Lillo-Unglaube, Canales-Johnson et al.,
1996; Ozols et al., 2016), but to our knowledge, only one study has empirically assessed the
persuasiveness of the straw man fallacy. Bizer, Kozak and Holterman (2009) conducted two
experiments in which they tested if individual personality traits like personal relevance and
the need for cognitive closure affect the persuasiveness of the straw man. Bizer et al. (2009)
report that participants in a high-relevance condition (content presented was important to the
hearer) are less likely to be persuaded by the straw man fallacy. They also found that
participants with a high need for cognitive closure (elevated decisiveness) are more likely to
be persuaded because they want to get to a conclusion more quickly. These experiments have
demonstrated that the straw man fallacy can indeed be influenced by cognitive factors such as
individual differences in personality traits.
It emerges from this overview that no studies, theoretical or experimental, have targeted
specific linguistic elements that influence the acceptability of the straw man fallacy. In
previous research (Schumann et al., 2019) we demonstrated that, amongst other factors, using
the causal connective puisque to introduce the fallacious argument, leads to a lower
acceptability of the straw man. We explained this effect by the observation that puisque
frequently indicates a given information towards which the speaker often conveys a tacitly
dissociative attitude (Zufferey, 2014). This means that by using the connective to introduce
an argument, the hearer’s awareness towards the fallacious misrepresentation of the original
position is raised. These results begged the questions whether other causal connectives that
also convey attributive meaning lead to similar results or not and whether such connectives
behave alike across languages. We investigate this issue further in this paper.
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3. Linguistic and psycholinguistic descriptions of connectives
What lacks in argumentative approaches to connectives is in an integration of the level of
detail that is found in linguistic and psycholinguistic studies, as we now outline. In these
studies, causal connectives are defined as linguistic units used to establish causal relations
between discourse segments, increasing textual coherence and structuring discourse (Halliday
& Hassan, 1976; Knott & Dale, 1994; Mann & Thompson, 1988). They do facilitate
discourse processing by instructing the hearer on how to interpret an utterance (Blakemore,
2002; Caron et al., 1988; Cozijn et al., 2011; Sanders et al., 2007; Zufferey & Gygax, 2016).
However, they are usually optional, as discourse relations can also be left implicit and
reconstructed by inference. For example, in (1) the connective since is used to indicate that
the segment following the connective is to be understood as a justification of the preceding
segment. By contrast, in (2), the meaning remains exactly the same when those two segments
are simply juxtaposed.
(1)
(2)

The fridge is empty since she ate all the food.
The fridge is empty. She ate all the food.

The same causal relation can also be expressed by other connectives like given that,
illustrated in (3), or as, illustrated in (4).
(3)
(4)

The fridge is empty given that she ate all food.
The fridge is empty as she ate all the food.

In examples (1), (3) and (4) the causal relation is formulated explicitly by using a connective,
whereas in (2) this relation must be inferred. However, the same connective, can express
different relations like it is the case for as. In (5) the connective as introduces a temporal
relation:
(5)

She realized there was no food left as she opened the fridge.

In this case, as is used to show that both actions happen simultaneously. The abovementioned examples demonstrate that causal connectives have a variety of functions, but it is
necessary to differentiate them according to their specific nuances.
The number of studies that have assessed the role of connectives for discourse
processing and understanding by inserting them in an argumentative context is very limited.
To our knowledge, only one study by Kamalski et al., (2008) has investigated the difference
between subjective causal connectives that are used to link claims and conclusion in the mind
of the speaker (6) and objective causal connectives that are used to link facts and events in
the real world (7).
(6)
(7)

Her fridge must be empty since she has eaten out the whole week.
Her fridge is empty because she has not been grocery shopping for a week.

In a first study, they found that participants were more likely to be persuaded when the texts
contained objective connectives rather than subjective connectives because the latter act as
forewarners, altering readers to the speakers’ persuasive intention, making them more critical
towards its content. The results of their second experiment confirmed the existence of a
forewarning effect related to subjective connectives even further. They were able to show
that short texts containing subjective connectives were less persuasive than texts with no
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connective. The study conducted by Kamalski et al. (2008) has shown that subjective
connectives do indeed create a forewarning effect. However, their notion of subjectivity is
not as fine-grained as suggested by other researchers. Degand and Pander Maat (2003) define
subjectivity as a scalar notion and other researchers like Pit (2007) and Zufferey and Cartoni
(2012) have shown that not every connective expresses the same degree of subjectivity. In
contrast, Kamalski et al. (2008) used a list of connectives but did not make more fine-grained
differences between them.
In this paper, we pursue this line of investigation further by assessing whether
differences related to the specific characteristics of different causal connectives in English
and French impact on the acceptability of straw man fallacies. To assess the roles of every
connective, we focus on 4 factors: subjectivity, givenness, polyfunctionality and preferential
placement. For the experiments in French we worked with the connectives puisque, étant
donné que and comme which are all used to express a causal relation that encodes an
attributive meaning. According to the LEXCONN data base of French connectives (Roze,
Danlos & Muller, 2012), puisque is a causal connective that can be used to convey objective,
as well as subjective content. However, in a contrastive corpus study Zufferey and Cartoni
(2012) have shown that 58.5% of the occurrences are related to the communication of
subjective causal relations expressing given information. Puisque therefore qualifies as a
subjective connective which, in addition, is often used to convey a tacitly dissociative attitude
towards the expressed content. This makes it an interesting connective to investigate from the
perspective of the straw man fallacy which relies on a misattribution content. The
LEXCONN data base (Roze et al., 2012) does not indicate a preferential placement for the
connective, it is equally used in sentence medial and sentence initial position.
The second causal connective with attributive meaning we focus on for the experiments is
étant donné que. According to a contrastive study conducted by Zufferey and Cartoni (2012),
this connective is used to conveyed both objective and subjective relations. The LEXCONN
data base (Roze et al., 2012) comes to the same conclusion: étant donné que can express both
types of causal links. Like in the case of puisque, étant donné que indirectly conveys the
information that the content following the connective is shared by the participants of the
discussion which creates and echoic meaning. Étant donné que has no polyfunctional value
and no preferential position (Roze et al., 2012).
There are no corpus studies specifically focusing on the causal connective comme, but
in the LEXCONN data base, comme is listed as a connective that can convey subjective as
well as objective information. Like in both previous cases, comme has an echoic meaning,
indicating the content following the connective as shared information. Comme is a highly
polyfunctional connective that has different uses. According to LEXCONN (Roze et al.,
2012) it can express causality, as well as temporal relations or indicate similarities and
parallels. Compared to the previous connectives, comme has a preferential placement and is
more frequently used in sentence initial position (Roze et al., 2012). However, this does not
mean that comme is ungrammatical or unacceptable in sentence medial position – it is just
less frequently used in this position.
For the experiments in English, we selected the closest equivalents of the French
connectives, namely since (for puisque), given that (for étant donné que) and as (for comme).
For the connective since, Zufferey & Cartoni (2012) report that in 41% of the cases, since
was used to communicate subjective and given content, and in 51% of the cases subjective
and new content. According to the Eng-DiMLex database (Das et al.,2018), since not only
expresses a causal relation but it can also convey temporally related information, meaning
that the connective has a polyfunctional value. The Eng-DiMLex data base (Das et al., 2018)
does not indicate a preferential placement for the connective, it is equally used in sentence
initial and sentence medial position.
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Following the Eng-DiMLex (Das et al., 2018) the connective given that is a causal
connective used to introduce subjective and objective information, and it is more often
associated with given information. The connective is non-polyfunctional and does not have a
preferential position. For given that there are no specific corpus studies focusing on the
different functions of the connective.
For as, Zufferey and Cartoni (2012) have shown in their contrastive corpus study that
the connective is mostly used to convey subjective and new information (51%), only in 25%
of the cases it was used to convey subjective and given information. According to the EngDiMLex data base (Das et al., 2018) as is a highly polyfunctional connective that can be used
to express different types of links like causal or temporal relations, and event similarities.
The table below contains an overview of the most important features of each connective.
Table 1
Main features of the connectives tested in the experiments

Puisque
Étant donné que
Comme
Since
Given that
As

Subjective
or
objective
Strongly subjective
Both
Both
Strongly subjective
Both
More subjective

Given or new

Polyfunctionality

More given
More given
Both
More new
More given
More new

No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Preferential
placement
No
No
Initial
No
No
No

We can conclude from this overview that, even if they all express a causal relation, the
connectives differ in some of the features within the same language. For the French
connectives, we notice that puisque has a very strong subjective feature compared to the other
two connectives and comme seems to be less strongly subjective and not as often used to
convey given information. Looking at the English causal connectives, we notice that since
and as appear to share more features compared to given that. We also see that the crosslinguistic connective-pairs (puisque + since / étant donné que + given that / comme + as) are
not identical in their features across languages.
4. Testing the influence of causal connectives for the acceptability of straw man
fallacies in French and English
In the following experiments, we investigated the role of the English and French connectives
described above for the acceptability of straw men. We pursued three main objectives for
these experiments. First, we wanted to assess whether straw man fallacies are more detected
when the fallacious segment is introduced with a connective, or when it is simply juxtaposed
to the previous segment. In light of the results from our previous research (Schumann et al.,
2019) and the forewarning effect put forward by Kamalski and colleagues (2008) we expect
that arguments introduced with a subjective connective should be less accepted compared to
arguments that are simply juxtaposed to the previous segment. Second, we wanted to
demonstrate that different connectives lead to different effects, which contributes to explain
why they are rarely interchangeable in a given language. We expect that connectives with a
very strongly subjective meaning like puisque will lead to a lower acceptability score than
less strongly subjective connectives like comme in French or as in English. Third, we expect
that, even if there exist very close translation equivalents between languages, connectives are
in fact not fully equivalent across languages. The experiments were structured following the
same experimental design as in our previous research (Schumann et al., 2019). We
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summarize the methodology of these studies below. We then present results for the pair of
connectives made of puisque and its closest English counterpart since, then move on to the
pair made of étant donné que and given that, and finally we report results for the pair made of
comme and as.
a. Participants
For the experiments in French, we recruited 123 French-speaking participants (94 women,
mean age: 26, age range: 18-57) and for the experiments in English, we recruited 123
English-speaking participants (79 women, mean age: 35, age range: 18-75). All participants
were recruited via the University of Fribourg and the crowdsourcing Platform Prolific©
(Prolific, Oxford, UK). The participants who took part in experiment via Prolific were
rewarded 2.70£ for their participation and the participants who participated via the University
of Fribourg received 30 minutes in experimental points. Before taking part in the experiment,
all participants had to give their informed consent. On average participants needed 26
minutes to complete the experiment.
b. Materials
We used a series of 40 short dialogues about various societal and political topics, as in
Schumann et al. (2019). The same structure was applied to all dialogues: the first statement
was always uttered by a person called Barbara and the second statement was a reply to
Barbara’s statement, expressed by someone called Alexander. As illustrated in (1), the first
statement uttered by Barbara contained a standpoint in the first segment “It is crucial to better
support young parents”. The second segment “having a child means a lot of financial
charges” was always introduced with the causal connective ‘because’ and expressed an
argument in support of the standpoint.
(8)

Barbara: It is crucial to better support young parents because having a child means
having a lot of financial responsibility.
Barbara : Il est crucial de mieux soutenir les jeunes parents parce qu’avoir un
enfant signifie beaucoup de charges financières.

Barbara’s part in the dialogue did not vary throughout the different experimental conditions.
Alexander always introduced the second half of the dialogue which contained the tested
variables and could appear in four different conditions. In the first condition illustrated in (9)
the fallacious argument is introduced with a connective. The statement contains a possible
consequence of the argument given by Barbara “Let’s raise the family allowance”. The first
segment of Alexander’s response was kept constant in all four conditions. Segment 1 was
then followed by the causal connective which introduced a distorted version of the argument
expressed by Barbara (“it only is about the money”).
(9)

Alexander: Let’s raise the family allowance CONNECTIVE it only is about the
money.
Alexandre : Augmentons les allocations familiales CONNECTIVE on ne pense qu’à
l’argent.

The second condition illustrated in (10) represents the exact same sentence, but this time the
causal relation between the segments remains implicit, meaning that the fallacious arguments
is simply juxtaposed to the previous segment.
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(10)

Alexander: Let’s raise the family allowance. It only is about the money.
Alexandre : Augmentons les allocations familiales. On ne pense qu’à l’argent.

The third experimental condition illustrated in (11) contains a non-fallacious reformulation of
the argument given by Barbara, and it is introduced by a connective.
(11)

Alexander: Let’s raise the family allowance CONNECTIVE the parents are under
economic pressure.
Alexandre : Augmentons les allocations familiales CONNECTIVE les parents sont
sous pression économique.

The last condition illustrated in (12) is the same sentence as in (11), but in this case the nonfallacious reformulation is juxtaposed to the previous segment without any connective.
(12)

Alexander: Let’s raise the family allowance. The parents are under economic
pressure.
Alexandre : Augmentons les allocations familiales. Les parents sont sous pression
économique.

In order to ensure that every participant only saw one out of the four possible conditions per
item, we attributed the four possible versions to four different lists using a Latin square
design. In total the participants read 10 items per condition, 40 dialogues in total.
c. Procedure
We used the crowdsourcing platform Qualtrics© (Qualtrics LLC, Provo: Utah, USA) to set
up the experiment. The first part of the experiment started with some short preliminary
instructions. The participants were told that they would have to read 40 short dialogues about
different societal topics between Barbara and Alexander and that they had to respond to 4
questions for every dialogue. These instructions were followed by a few demographic
questions about gender, age, native language, and place of residence. In order to familiarize
the participants with the task, they were first presented with two trial dialogues. After that,
the participants moved on to the actual experimental task. They had to read the 40 dialogues
appearing in a randomized order. The participants were asked to respond to 4 questions on a
6-point Likert scale ranging from “No, absolutely not” to “Yes, absolutely”. An additional
option (“I don’t know”) was included in case the participants were not able or not willing to
respond to the questions. The first two questions illustrated in (13) and (14) focused on two
core features of the straw man fallacy. The first question assessed the exaggerative nature of
the straw man. This question was asked in order to investigate if the participants were able to
detect cases in which Alexander expressed more extreme positions containing straw men.
(13)

Is the conclusion reached by Alexander proportionate to what Barbara has said?

The second question aimed at the perceived logical link between the statements. This
question was used to assess whether participants were able to spot the incoherence between
the statements when the connective announcing attributive content was followed by a
fallacious argument that did not endorse the content originally expressed by the speaker.
(14)

Does the conclusion reached by Alexander logically follow from what Barbara has
said?

The third question illustrated in (15) and the fourth question illustrated in (16) targeted the
agreement with both speakers.
7

(15)
(16)

Do you agree with Alexander?
Do you agree with Barbara?

Answers to the question targeting the agreement with Alexander were expected to be
influenced by the nature of the argument (non-fallacious or fallacious). Indeed, if participants
have spotted the fallacy, agreement should be lower for the fallacious reformulations. The
question targeting the agreement with Barbara was asked as a control question. In this case,
we expected participants to respond according to their own beliefs and opinions, since
Barbara’s statements did not contain any manipulated variable.
d. Analysis
We performed 2x2 repeated measure ANOVA with two within-subject factors (fallacious or
non-fallacious argument; present or absent connective) on the data. One separate analysis was
performed for each connective. Only answers given on the six-point scale were included in
the analysis. When participants chose the additional option (“I don’t know”), their answer
was treated as missing data. All connectives were analyzed with the same procedure.
e. Results for since and puisque
In Table 2, we report the means and standard deviation for each condition.
Table 2
Results for experiment 1a (since) and 2a (puisque)
Since
Mean

SD

Puisque
Mean

SD

3.58
3.65
4.43
4.54

0.81
0.78
0.71
0.63

3.09
3.35
4.07
4.07

0.76
0.74
0.66
0.72

Question 2 targeting the logical link:
Fallacious argument with connective
Fallacious argument without connective
Non-fallacious argument with connective
Non-fallacious without connective

3.64
3.79
4.47
4.59

0.73
0.74
0.67
0.61

3.54
3.82
4.17
4.27

0.71
0.65
0.59
0.64

Question 3 targeting the agreement with Alexander:
Fallacious argument with connective
Fallacious argument without connective
Non-fallacious argument with connective
Non-fallacious argument without connective

3.49
3.53
4.46
4.63

0.7
0.74
0.51
0.65

3.16
3.44
4.19
4.40

0.74
0.69
0.65
0.58

Question 4 targeting the agreement with Barbara:
Fallacious argument with connective
Fallacious argument without connective
Non-fallacious argument with connective
Non-fallacious argument without connective

4.46
4.53
4.69
4.77

0.63
0.69
0.54
0.54

4.35
4.45
4.59
4.65

0.58
0.69
0.55
0.51

Question 1 targeting the proportion:
Fallacious argument with connective
Fallacious argument without connective
Non-fallacious argument with connective
Non-fallacious argument without connective

For the first question targeting the exaggerative nature of the straw man, we report a
significant effect on the type of argument for the connective since: non-fallacious arguments
(M = 4.49) are rated as more acceptable than fallacious ones (M = 3.62) [F1(1,41) = 66.63, p
< 0.001; F2(1,39) = 68.47, p < 0.001]. No effect was found for the presence of absence of the
8

connective since [F1(1,41) = 1.664, p = 0.2; F2(1,39) = 1.78, p = 0.19]. For the connective
puisque, we found a similar pattern. First, fallacious arguments (M = 3.22) were less accepted
than non-fallacious arguments (M = 4.07) [F1(1,40) = 122.52, p < 0.001; F2 (1,39) = 72,43, p
< 0.001]. Second, sentences with puisque were not less accepted compared to sentences
without connective, even though the difference approaches significance in both analyses [F1
(1,40) = 4.3, p = 0.05; F2 (1,39) = 3.1, p = 0.09].
The results on the second question, targeting the logical link, returned two main
effects for the connective since. First, participants rated the non-fallacious arguments as more
acceptable (M = 4.54) compared to fallacious ones (M = 3.72) [F1(1,41) = 96.07, p < 0.001;
F2(1,39) = 75.72, p < 0.001]. Second, arguments were more accepted when the causal
relation was left implicit (M = 4.2) rather than introduced by since (M = 4.06) [F1(1,41) =
96.07, p = 0.02; F2(1,39) = 4.14, p = 0.05]. We also report two significant effects for the
connective puisque. First, participants rated the non-fallacious arguments as more acceptable
(M = 4.22) compared to fallacious arguments (M = 3.68) [F1 (1,40) = 47.9, p < 0.001; F2
(1,39) = 39.7, p < 0.001]. Second, arguments were more accepted when the causal relation
was left implicit (M = 4.05) rather than introduced by puisque (M = 3.86) [F1 (140) = 10.09,
p = 0.003; F2 (1,39) = 7.97, p = 0.007].
On the third question, with since, the analysis returned a significant effect for the
nature of the argument. Fallacious argument scored a lower acceptability (M = 3.51)
compared to non-fallacious ones (M = 4.55) [F1(1,41) = 96.53, p <0001; F2(1,39) = 68.78, p
< 0.001]. By contrast, the presence or absence of since did not affect the scores significantly
(F2) [F1(1,41) = 2.1, p = 0.155; F2(1,39) = 4.09, p = 0.05]. With puisque, the analysis also
returned a significant effect for the nature of the argument. Again, fallacious arguments
(M = 3.3) are less accepted than non-fallacious ones (M = 4.3) [F1(1,40) = 95.82, p < 0.001;
F2(1,39) = 85.77, p < 0.001]. Contrary to since, the analysis also returned a significant effect
for the use or non-use of the connective. Agreements were higher when the relation was
implicit (M = 3.92) than when it was introduced by puisque (M = 3.68) [F1(1,40) = 8.08, p =
0.01; F2(1,39) = 13.01, p = 0.001].
Finally, for the last question targeting the agreement with Barbara, the analysis
returned a significant effect for the type of argument with since. Participants rated nonfallacious arguments are more acceptable (M = 4.73) compared to fallacious ones (M = 4.5)
[F1(1,41) = 13.15, p = 0.001; F2 (1,39) = 18.05, p <0001]. No effect was found for the
presence or absence of since [F1(1,41) = 1.18, p = 0.28; F2(1,39) = 1.07, p = 0.31]. For
puisque, we also found a main effect for the nature of the argument, as non-fallacious
versions were better accepted (M = 4.62) than fallacious ones (M = 4.4) [F1(1,40) = 12.5, p =
0.001; F2(1,39) = 13.02, p = 0.001]. No effect was found for the presence or absence of
puisque [F1(1,40) = 1.77, p = 0.19; F2(1,39) = 1.11, p = 0.3].
f. Results for given that and étant donné que
The means and standard deviations of each condition are reported in Table 3, (next page, p.
10).
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Table 3
Results for experiment 1b (given that) and 2b (étant donné que)
Given that
Mean
SD

Étant donné que
Mean
SD

Question 1 targeting the proportion:
Fallacious argument with connective
Fallacious argument without connective
Non-fallacious argument with connective
Non-fallacious argument without connective

3.63
3.6
4.45
4.58

0.8
0.77
0.63
0.61

3.97
4.06
4.68
4.88

0.9
0.8
0.6
0.6

Question 2 targeting the logical link:
Fallacious argument with connective
Fallacious argument without connective
Non-fallacious argument with connective
Non-fallacious without connective

3.83
3.45
4.45
4.62

0.68
0.77
0.67
0.63

4.35
4.41
4.74
4.88

0.73
0.73
0.62
0.61

Question 3 targeting the agreement with Alexander:
Fallacious argument with connective
Fallacious argument without connective
Non-fallacious argument with connective
Non-fallacious argument without connective

3.55
3.61
4.41
4.66

0.78
0.77
0.6
0.56

3.99
3.94
4.68
4.88

0.74
0.77
0.59
0.58

Question 4 targeting the agreement with Barbara:
Fallacious argument with connective
Fallacious argument without connective
Non-fallacious argument with connective
Non-fallacious argument without connective

4.59
4.48
4.67
4.75

0.61
0.71
0.51
0.5

4.8
4.8
4.99
4.9

0.63
0.52
0.49
0.61

For the first question targeting the exaggerative nature of the straw man, we report a
significant effect on the type of argument for the connective given that: non-fallacious
arguments are rated as more acceptable (M = 4.52) compared to non-fallacious ones
(M = 3.62) [F1(1,39) = 73.69, p < 0.001; F2(1,39) = 65.88]. No effect was found for the
presence or absence of given that [F1(1,39) = 0.49, p = 0.49; F2(1,39) = 0, p = 0.99]. For the
connective étant donné que, two main effects were found. First, the acceptability was lower
for fallacious arguments (M = 4.02) compared to non-fallacious ones (M = 4.78) [F1(1,40) =
71.37, p < 0.001; F2 (1,39) = 57.34, p < 0.001]. Second, implicit relations were rated as more
acceptable (M = 4.5) than arguments introduced by étant donné que (M = 4.33) [F1(1,40) =
6.05, p < 0.05; F2(1,39) = 7.74, p < 0.01].
Results on the second question targeting the logical link between the statements
indicated a preference for non-fallacious over fallacious arguments. For given that, nonfallacious arguments were rater higher (M = 4.54) compared to fallacious ones (M = 3.82)
[F1(1,39) = 81.29, p < 0.001; F2(1,39) = 43.95, p < 0.001]. However, the analysis returned
no effect for the presence or absence of the connective given that [F1(1,39) = 1.33, p = 0.26;
F2(1,39) = 0.38, p = 0.54]. The results for the French version with étant donné que returned a
significant effect with a higher score for non-fallacious (M = 4.81) over fallacious arguments
(M = 4.38) [F1(1,40) = 38.46, p < 0001; F2(1,39) = 24.54, p < 0.001]. As in English, the
analysis returned no effect for the presence or absence of the connective étant donné que,
even though the results approached significance in both analyses [F1(1,40) = 3.96, p = 0.053;
F2(1,39) = 3.25, p = 0.08].
On the question targeting the agreement with Alexander, the results showed a main
effect on the type of argument for given that. Again, participants preferred non-fallacious
(M = 4.53) over fallacious arguments (M = 3.58) [F1(1,39) = 102.65, p <0.001; F2(1,39) =
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49.76, p < 0.001]. The presence or absence of given that did not result in a significant
difference [F1(1,39) = 3.76, p = 0.6; F2(1,39) = 3.37, p = 0.74]. Results on the connective
étant donné que show a significant difference for the nature of the argument. Non-fallacious
arguments (M = 4.78) were rated as more acceptable compared to fallacious arguments
(M = 3.97) [F1(1,40) = 105.57, p < 0.001; F2(1,39) = 55.13, p < 0.001]. The presence or
absence of étant donné que did not produce a significant difference either [F1(1,40) = 1.04, p
= 0.32; F2(1,39) = 1.55, p = 0.22].
Finally, on the agreement with Barbara, the analysis did not return any effect for the
type of argument with given that [F1(1,39) = 3.91, p = 0.06; F2(1,39) = 2.81, p = 0.1], nor for
the presence or absence of the connective [F1(1,39) = 0.12, p = 0.73; F2(1,39) = 0.08, p =
0.78]. No significant effect was found either for étant donné que on the type of argument
[F1(1,40) = 3.63, p = 0.06; F2(1,39) = 3.87, p = 0.06], or on the presence or absence of the
connective [F1(1,40) = 0.66, p = 0.42; F2(1,39) = 0.54, p = 0.47].
g. Results for as and comme
Table 4 reports the means and standard deviation for all conditions.
Table 4
Results for experiment 1c (as) and 2c (comme)
As
Mean

SD

Comme
Mean

SD

Question 1 targeting the proportion:
Fallacious argument with connective
Fallacious argument without connective
Non-fallacious argument with connective
Non-fallacious argument without connective

3.68
3.59
4.57
4.59

0.74
0.68
0.63
0.54

3.45
3.59
4.49
4.45

0.63
0.79
0.71
0.75

Question 2 targeting the logical link:
Fallacious argument with connective
Fallacious argument without connective
Non-fallacious argument with connective
Non-fallacious without connective

3.72
3.75
4.53
4.58

0.71
0.71
0.62
0.55

4.07
4.14
4.56
4.62

0.63
0.72
0.61
0.63

Question 3 targeting the agreement with Alexander:
Fallacious argument with connective
Fallacious argument without connective
Non-fallacious argument with connective
Non-fallacious argument without connective

3.54
3.45
4.56
4.58

0.64
0.64
0.57
0.67

3.51
3.53
4.52
4.47

0.69
0.59
0.56
0.72

Question 4 targeting the agreement with Barbara:
Fallacious argument with connective
Fallacious argument without connective
Non-fallacious argument with connective
Non-fallacious argument without connective

4.61
4.64
4.76
4.78

0.56
0.59
0.61
0.56

4.76
4.71
4.86
4.92

0.52
0.57
0.51
0.6

For the first question targeting the exaggerative nature of the straw man, we report a
significant effect on the type of argument for the connective as. Fallacious arguments
(M = 3.64) are less accepted than non-fallacious ones (M = 4.58) [F1(1,40) = 100.46, p <
0.001; F2(1,39) = 80.62, p < 0.001]. The presence or absence of as did not result in a
significant effect [F1(1,40) = 0.25, p = 0.62; F2(1,39) = 0.36, p = 0.55]. The French
connective comme led to similar results. There was a significant effect for the nature of the
argument, as non-fallacious arguments (M = 4.47) led to higher acceptance rates than
fallacious ones (M = 3.53) [F1(1,39) = 102.44, p < 0.001; F2(1,39) = 56.74, p < 0.001]. The
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presence or absence of comme did not return any effects either [F1(1,39) = 0.55, p = 0.46;
F2(1,39) = 0.33, p = 0.57].
We find the same pattern on the second question targeting the logical link between the
statements. Again, for as, responses to non-fallacious arguments reached a higher score
(M = 4.56) compared to fallacious arguments (M = 3.74) [F1(1,40) = 101.37, p < 0.001;
F2(1,39) = 66.18, p < 0.001]. The presence or absence of as did not lead to a significant
difference [F1(1,40) = 0.34, p = 0.57; F2(1,39) = 0.35, p = 0.56]. The results for the
connective comme did return a significant effect for the type of argument. Again, fallacious
arguments (M = 4.11) led to a lower acceptability score than non-fallacious ones (M = 4.59)
[F1(1,39) = 43.33, p < 0.001; F2(1,39) = 30.45, p < 0.001]. No effect was found for the
presence or absence of comme [F1(1,39) = 1.65, p = 0.21; F2(1,39) = 1.06, p = 0.31].
The results for as on the third question targeting the agreement with Alexander show
a significant difference for the nature of the argument. Participants gave higher acceptance
scores to non-fallacious arguments (M = 4.57) compared to fallacious ones (M = 3.5)
[F1(1,40) = 121.62, p < 0.001; F2(1,39) = 68.8, p < 0.001]. The results on the presence or
absence of as did not return any results [F1(1,40) = 0.23, p = 0.63; F2(1,39) = 0.23, p =
0.63]. The same pattern was found for the connective comme. The results showed a main
effect on the type of argument, with non-fallacious arguments (M = 4.5) leading to a higher
acceptance rate compared to fallacious ones (M = 3.52) [F1(1,39) = 104.73, p < 0.001;
F2(1,39) = 62.31, p < 0.001]. The presence or absence of comme did yield a significant
difference [F1(1,39) = 0.03, p = 0.86; F2(1,39) = 0.02, p = 0.88].
Finally, for the agreement with Barbara, results showed a similar pattern. Again,
participants gave a higher acceptance score to non-fallacious (M = 4.77) compared to
fallacious ones (M = 4.63) [F1(1,40 = 5.06, p = 0.03; F2(1,39) = 5.88, p = 0.02]. The
presence or absence of the connective as did not create a significant difference [F1(1,40) =
0.24, p = 0.627; F2(1,39) = 0.57, p = 0.46]. Results for the connective comme returned the
same pattern. Participants gave a higher score to non-fallacious arguments (M = 4.89)
compared to fallacious ones (M = 4.73) [F1(1,39) = 6.29, p = 0.02; F2(1,39) = 7.15, p =
0.01]. The presence or absence of comme did not create a significant effect [F1(1,39) = 0.01,
p = 0.91; F2(1,39) = 0.31, p = 0.58].
h. Discussion
Results from our experiments clearly indicate that participants are intuitively able to detect
fallacies: in all six experiments, they systematically rated non-fallacious statements as more
acceptable compared to fallacious ones. In addition, the effects were always significant for
the first three questions targeting the exaggerative nature of the straw man, the logical link
between the statements and the agreement with Alexander. This is due to the fact that, in all
three cases, the answers were influenced by the manipulated variables. By contrast, the
question targeting the agreement with Barbara, sometimes led to a significant difference and
sometimes not. This result was expected since answers to this question vary depending on the
personal opinion of each participant (whether they agree with her standpoint or not) and
should therefore not be influenced by the manipulated variables.
More critically for the argument of this paper, we also observed different patterns of
effects related to the uses of connectives. A summary of the effects created by the six
connectives in each of the four questions is presented in Table 5. In this table, “yes” means
that a significant difference was found, always in the direction of a lower acceptability when
the connective was used compared to the implicit version, and “no” means that no significant
difference was found. The tag “fuzzy” was used when the analysis approached significance in
both F1 and F2, and the lack of effect could therefore be due to lack of statistical power.

12

Table 5
Summary of significant effects created by each connective
since
puisque
given that
étant donné que
as
comme

Exaggeration
No
Fuzzy
No
Yes
No
No

Logical link
Yes
Yes
No
Fuzzy
No
No

Agreement with A
No
Yes
No
No
No
No

Agreement with B
No
No
No
No
No
No

First, our results indicate that the connective puisque does indeed function as a forewarner
and leads the participants to be more vigilant regarding the segment following it. When the
argument introduced by puisque is of a fallacious nature, reader expectations are not met
because puisque instructs the reader to consider the content following the connective as given
information whereas the attributed content is not faithful in the case of a straw man fallacy.
These findings are in line with the forewarning effect put forward by Kamalski et al. (2008),
showing that strongly subjective connectives act as indicators that the speakers’ own
subjectivity is at play. This effect was moreover found on two and even the three critical
questions in our experiment. By contrast, its English “counterpart” since did not create such a
clear effect, as it only gave rise to a significant difference in one of the questions, targeting
the logical link between segments. Hence, our results provide some further indication that
even closely related connectives in different languages do not function in a similar way, and
this impacts their role in persuasive contexts. Similarly, étant donné que in French creates a
stronger effect as a forewarner compared to given that in English.
Given that puisque and since are both rated as strongly subjective connectives in
current analyses, it is not clear what could explain these differences, as the forewarning effect
was specifically related to this feature. Our data indicates therefore that subjectivity is not the
only feature that is relevant to explain the role of connectives for argumentation. We suggest
that an alternative explanation could be the type of speaker attitude towards the attributed
content. It has been argued that puisque conveys a tacitly dissociative attitude (Zufferey,
2014). It might well be that this feature is what sets this connective apart from the others.
Future work will need to explore this feature using corpus data to empirically assess the
validity of this hypothesis.
Another limitation from existing literature is that étant donné que and given that do not
seem to have a variable profile in the databases of connectives, yet they do not play a similar
role as forewarners. Again, this result points to the necessity of identifying additional features
and also of getting a more fine-grained picture of their profile using corpus data. The last pair
made of comme and as create the reverse problem. They seem this time to play a similar role
for argumentation, given that none of them plays a role a forewarner. Yet, their profile is
partly divergent in current databases of connectives. This result underlines again the necessity
to go beyond coarse-grained classifications of connectives to get an empirically based profile
of each connective in all these dimensions (subjectivity, givenness, speaker attitude). We
have provided such an analysis for French connectives in Schumann et al. (submitted), and
results clearly indicate that corpus-based analyses of connectives are much more accurate as
predictors of their argumentative effects. Indeed, in this analysis, we found that puisque has
a higher degree of subjectivity compared to étant donné que, which has in turn a higher
degree of subjectivity compared to comme. Similarly, puisque is more often used to convey
given information compared to étant donné que, which is in turn more used to convey given
information compared to comme. Thus, the scaling of connectives is convergent on both
dimensions: puisque > étant donné que > comme. In addition, this profile drawn based on
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corpus data perfectly matches the strength with which all three connectives affect
argumentation. A similar analysis will need to be performed on cross-linguistic data in future
work in order to further deepen our understanding of the role of connectives in
argumentation.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, our goal was to illustrate the role of connectives for argumentation. Going
beyond the coarse-grained classification of discourse markers found in some works in
argumentation, we argued that the fine-grained analysis found in pragmatics and discourse
studies provide more indications about the role of connectives as forewarners in
argumentative contexts. We demonstrated in a series of experiments conducted on three
French and three English causal connectives that connectives do not always play a similar
role in argumentation. First, our experiments showed that the presence or absence of some
connectives does indeed play a significant role for the communication of fallacies. When the
fallacious argument is introduced with a strongly subjective connective most often used to
convey given information with a tacitly dissociative attitude (i.e. puisque), participants score
lower acceptability rates which confirms the results from our previous work (Schumann et
al., 2019) and adds credit to the forewarning effect reported by Kamalski et al. (2008).
However, important differences are to be mentioned within the same language and across
languages which begs the need for more fine-grained studies of specific connectives. In sum,
the experiments presented in this paper show the necessity of a precise and more fine-grained
investigation of connectives in order to understand their impact on fallacies and
argumentation in general.
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